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I. Introduction
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,' decided
June 23, 1983, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional
an exercise by Congress of a legislative veto provision under section
244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 The ramifications
of the Court's decision, affirming the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit,3 are broad in scope, affecting both the theoretical implications
of the doctrine of separation of powers and its practical application to a
wide range of federal statutes." Consequently, the Court's ruling in
Chadha has received public attention usually afforded only to Supreme
Court decisions concerning first or fourteenth amendment rights. 5
The scope of this comment will be threefold. First, it will examine
generally the roots of the decision in Chadha by focusing on the doc-
trine of separation of powers. The philosophical basis for the doctrine
will be shown as it affected the Framers' vision finally set out in the
United States Constitution. The structure of the Constitution will be
investigated, to better glean specific instances, as well as general princi-
ples, of the doctrine. Case law prior to Chadha will also be discussed to
better understand the Supreme Court's past interpretation of the doc-
trine leading up to the Chadha case. Second, the Chadha case itself
will be treated, focusing separately on the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions and the relative merits of each position. Finally, the
1. - U.S.__, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (the decision was 7-2; Burger, C.J. writ-
ing for the majority, Powell, J. concurring, and White and Rehnquist, JJ. dissenting in
separate opinions).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976). See infra note 73.
3. Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.
1980).
4. Justice White states "[tioday the Court... sounds the death knell for nearly
200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.'"
Chadha, - U.S. at .. , 103 S. Ct. at 2792 (White, J. dissenting). For an exhaustive
list of statutes so affected see id. at ., 103 S. Ct. at 2811-16 app. 1.
5. See N.Y. Times, June 24, 1983, § 1, at 1, col. 5; N.Y. Times, June 25, 1983,
§ 1, at 9, col. 4; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1983, § 4, at 1, col. 5; Wash. Post, June 24,
1983, at A4, col. 1.
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"aftermath" of Chadha will be discussed: its effect on statutory law in
general, questions of severability, and the possible contours of a legisla-
tive response to the case.
II. Separation of Powers Doctrine
A. Philosophical Basis
Since the writings of Plato,6 the idea that coordinate branches of
government should be separate as to their essential functions and pow-
ers has been axiomatic to various theories of benign government. Aris-
totle first authored that which may be seen as a treatise on the doctrine
of separation of powers. 7 Yet, it was not until after the Enlightenment
that the doctrine gained force and proved a ground for heated debate.
Locke discussed the doctrine at length. He rested his arguments for
separation of powers on the need for a balance of powers, not only to
check the executive and legislative branches,' but also to provide a
buffer against monarchial tyranny." However, it was in 1748 when
Charles de Montesquieu published his treatise, The Spirit of the
Laws,10 that the doctrine of separation of powers was first articulated
in the form later adopted by the Framers of the United States
Constitution.
Montesquieu begins his treatment of separation of powers by iden-
tifying three types of power constituitive of government in general: the
legislative, the executive, in terms of matter of civil law.1' This tripar-
6. PLATO, LAWS in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES 1360 passim (E. Hamilton ed.
and trans. 1961). Plato's ideas on the separation of powers are in no sense crystallized
in the Laws. Part of this confusion can be attributed to the constant repart6e between
the principals in the dialogue, true to the Socratic concepts of logos and dialektikon.
7. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 156-63 (H. Rackham trans. 1932). Along with this gen-
eral expos6, Aristotle further divides into three elements that which the good politician
must consider in framing a constitution: the deliberative element, the administrative
element, and the judicial element. Id. at 189. See also ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN
ETHICS 158-61 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962). For a broad overview of Aristotle's place in
the philosophical development of the doctrine of separation of powers see generally M.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 21-22 (1967).
8. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 243-46, 356, 370, 382-84, 386,
392 (P. Laslett ed. 1970).
9. Id. at 382.
10. C. MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIX (J. Gressaye ed. 1950).
11. 2 id. at 63 ("II y a dans chaque Etat trois sortees de pouvoirs: la puissance
legislative, la puissance executrice des choses qui dependent du droit des gens, et la
[Vol. 8
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tite scheme closely follows that proposed by Locke, a fact not the least
startling since Montesquieu models his utopian form of constitutional
government on the English constitution. 2 Indeed, the entire section of
The Spirit of the Laws dealing with the separation of powers is subti-
tled "On the English Constitution." 3 Montesquieu then elucidates his
notion of the third power of government and ascribes to it the power of
judgment,1 4 thus closely paralleling the modern notion of the judiciary.
He goes on the point out that these three powers should be exercised
separately by branches of government entrusted to each, lest tyranny
result.15 The political liberty of all subjects of government would be
compromised if one hand should wield two or more powers
concurrently.16
Interpretation of Montesquieu's theory led to two widely divergent
schools. The first school states that Montesquieu's exposition of the
doctrine of separation of powers can best be seen as an advocacy for a
"pure" doctrine of separation of powers:
[A] "pure doctrine" of the separation of powers might be formu-
lated in the following way: It is essential for the establishment and
maintenance of political liberty that the government be divided into
three branches or departments, the legislative, the executive, and
the judiciary. To each of these three branches there is a corre-
sponding indentifiable function of government. . .Each branch of
the government must be confined to the exercise of its own func-
tion and not allowed to encroach upon the functions of the other
branches.17
puissance executrice de celles qui dependent du droit civil.").
12. See M. VILE, supra note 7, at 86. The English judiciary had strong feelings
embracing the separation of powers. Blackstone states:
In all tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or the right of
making and enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same
man .... But, where the legislative and executive authority are in distinct
hands, the former will take care not to entrust the latter with so large a
power, as may tend to the subversion of it's own independence, and there-
with of the liberty of the subject.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146. For a complete background on constitutional
law in England, see generally H. GREAVE, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION (1958).
13. C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 63.
14. Id. ("la puissance de juger..
15. Id. at 63-64.
16. Id. at 64.
17. M. VILE, supra note 7, at 13 (emphasis added).
1984]
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Thus, the 'pure' doctrine would opt for complete autonomy of the
separate branches of government. It would constitute "a thoroughgoing
separation of agencies, functions, and persons." 18 Indeed, it has been
argued that Montesquieu's treatment of separation of powers cannot,
by definition, be seen to admit of any mixing of function.1 9
A second school argues, however, that Montesquieu's theory can
be interpreted as allowing for a partial separation of powers. This
would result in a system of checks and balances between branches to
ensure the non-encroachment of one branch upon another's exercise of
its essential functions.2 0 The argument here is that without the strong
need for independence of branches, due to the fact that the representa-
tive branches would cease to be coordinate in nature:21 one branch,, if
subordinate to another, could not a priori check another's abuse of a
power vested to a third branch.
It is difficult to ascertain with exactitude Montesquieu's actual po-
sition relative to the two schools. 2 However, it is readily apparent
which school of thought was adopted by the Framers of the United
States Constitution.
B. The Framers' Vision
It is clear that there was a general consensus that Montesquieu's
ideas were to be interpreted, for the purpose of drafting the Constitu-
tion, as advocating a mixed form of partial separation of powers.2 3 This
18. Id. at 85.
19. See W. Struck, Montesquieu als Politiker, 298 HISTORISCHE STUDIEN 1, 68-
69 (1933). But see 2 C. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 10, at 72-73, where it is stated that
there must be three exceptions to the non-unification of the legislative and the judicial
powers: "(1) In cases of trial of nobles, trial should not be held in a common court, but
rather by peers in the legislature. (2) In cases of impeachment. (3) For the purposes of
mitigating criminal sentences." Id.
20. See M. VILE, supra note 7, at 85-86.
21. Id. at 95.
22. See Hazo, Montisquieu and the Separation of Powers, 54 A.B.A. J. 665,
668 (1968).
23. This is not to say that there was no diversity at all on this issue. During the
"'newspaper debates" on the drafting of the Constitution there were dissenting voices
disfavoring the doctrine. See Centinel I, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, Oct. 5,
1787 reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI-
TUTION at 330-31 (M. Jensen ed. 1976). However, upon the taking of actual vote dur-
ing the structured debates on the adoption of the Constitution, the tripartite structure
was passed unanimously in the affirmative. See 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOP-
[Vol. 8
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uniformity of thought as to the horizontal aspect of separation of pow-
ers, concerning separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions, traversed the political rift dividing the Federalists and the
non-Federalists concerning the vertical aspect of the doctrine, concern-
ing the sparation of federal as opposed to state powers. Even Jefferson,
firmly a non-Federalist, gave his stamp of approval to the separation of
branches of government.24
Of course, the incorporation of the separation of powers into the
Framers' vision of the Constitution must be set upon a backdrop of the
Articles of Confederation, a decidedly nonfederalist document. To
those living under the Articles "[the] union was merely a means to
their end, the independence of the several states. . .centralization was
to be opposed."'2 5 Indeed, the non-Federalist sentiments backing the
Articles were "antagonistic to any government with pretensions toward
widespread dominion."26 Thus, any federal structure superimposed on
the several states must be controlled. Although such control is afforded
by an adoption of the vertical doctrine of separation of powers alloting
to the states certain sovereign rights, such protection is also given
through implementation of the horizontal doctrine. Through the hori-
zontal doctrine, in its mixed form, each branch provides protection
aganist encroachment by coordinant branches. This translates into
greater protection of individual citizens when confronted with the fed-
eral system.27 Thus for example, the peoples' will, as represented in the
legislative branch, could not be foiled by an executive override which
would invade the essential function of the legislature.
James Madison wrote, concerning the idea of partial horizontal
separation of powers:
From these facts by which Montesquieu was guided it may clearly
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 183 (1836).
See generally Diamond, The Zenith of Separation of Powers Theory: The Federal
Convention of 1787, 8 PUBLIUS 45 (No. 3 1978) (issue analysis of the debates of 1787);
Carey, Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model. A Reply to the Critics, 72
AM. POL. Sci. REv. 151 (1978) (a rethinking of the Madisonian viewpoint as relates to
the Federalist and the Federal Convention).
24. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787) in T. JEF-
FERSON, SELECTED WRITINGS 68 (H. Mansfield ed. 1979).
25. M. JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 161 (1940). See also U.S.
ART. OF CONFED. art. II.
26. M. JENSEN, supra, at 161.
27. See M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION 48-50 (1913).
1984]
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be inferred, that in saying 'there can be no liberty where the legis-
lative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body
of magistrates,' or 'if the power of judging be not separated from
the legislative and executive powers,' he did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over
the acts of each other. His meaning, as his own words import, and
still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, [the
English constitution], can amount to no more than this, that where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department, the funda-
mental principles of a free constitution, are subverted.28
This view was reiterated by Madison in debate during the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787, where he emphasized the need for separa-
tion on a partial basis between the executive and judicial branches.2 9
The means by which this separation should be instituted "consists in
giving those who administer each department, the necessary constitu-
tional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of the
others." 0 In this way the checks and balances of power will check am-
bition against ambition.31
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 245 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982). See also
1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 393 (5th
ed. 1905):
But when we speak of a separation of the three great departments of gov-
ernment, and maintain that the separation is indispensable to public lib-
erty, we are to understand this maxim in a limited sense. It is not meant to
affirm that they must be kept wholly and entirely separate and distinct,
and have no common link of connection or dependence, the one upon the
other, in the slightest degree.
Id.
29. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 34-35 (M. Farrand
ed. 1911) (debate of Tuesday, July 17, 1787). Here Madison argues for the full collat-
eral nature of the judiciary in the scheme of government. There are suggestions that
this full treatment of the nature of the judiciary is the great American innvation on
Montesquieu's initial theory. See W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS 125 (Tulane Studies in Political Science No. 9, 1965). The judiciary had a
special place in the separation of power since "[tihe aid of the judges as council of
revision would double the advantages and diminish the dangers of his [the executive's
position." 1 F. THORPE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 343
(1901). See also THE FEDERAL CONVENTION AND FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE
AMERICAN STATES lxxxiv (W. Solberg ed. 1958) (introduction by W. Solberg).
30. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 262 (J. Madison) (G. Wills ed. 1982).
31. Id.
[Vol. 8
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C. The Constitutional Text and pre-Chadha Interpretation
Cases concerning the separation of powers are few in relation to
other areas of constitutional interpretation. The cases deal with a wide
variety of governmental powers. Additionally, cases concerning separa-
tion of powers arise in a decidedly intense political setting, due to the
primordial nature of the doctrine in the constitutional scheme. Factu-
ally, the cases concern seizure by the executive of steel production,3 2
claims of executive privilege in the Senate "Watergate" investigation,3
the nature of the executive's position as Commander in Chief of the
armed forces,3 and, of course, the propriety of the legislative veto.3 5
Therefore, the constitutional principles of separation of powers are at
times best described as obscure.
The Supreme Court has, since its inception, maintained Madison's
view of partial horizontal separation of powers. Justice Brandeis explic-
itly stated in Myers v. United States:
The separation of the powers of government did not make each
branch completely autonomous. It left each, in some measure, de-
pendent upon the others, as it left to each power to exercise, in
some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and
judicial.3 6
Justice Brandeis also pointed out that the "[c]hecks and balances
were established in order that this should be 'a government of laws and
not men.' "37 This language finds further support in Buckley v. Valeo
where the Court states, "a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively." 88 This, however, is ex-
actly the problematic aspect of adjudications on separation of powers;
namely, how much encroachment is constitutional? To state this query
conversely: what is an essential function of a given branch for purposes
of determining the constitutionality of the acts of a coordinate branch?
In general, there are two ways to violate the separation of powers.
32. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
33. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
34. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
35. Chadha, - U.S. .. , 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
36. 272 U.S. at 291 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
37. Id. at 292.
38. 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
1984]
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First, one branch may interfere with another branch's assigned func-
tion. Second, one branch may assume a function entrusted to another
branch. 9 When a constitutional violation takes place in the first in-
stance, it is usually due to an unconstitutional claim of privilege, in an
attempt to exclude a member of one branch from a process associated
with an essential function of another branch. Thus, the Court held as
unconstitutional, as violation of separation of powers, a claim by Presi-
dent Nixon to "an absolute privilege of confidentiality for all Presiden-
tial communications. ' 40 The failure to produce documents upon the is-
suance of a subpoena duces tecum for judicial consideration interfered
with the judicial branch's primary function: "to say what the law is. '
The Court stated that since "the legitimate needs of the judicial pro-
cess may outweigh Presidential privilege, it is necessary to resolve those
competing interests in a manner that preserves the essential functions
of each branch. 42 It is interesting to note that the claim of Presidential
privilege itself was based on an absolute view of separation of powers.43
However, the need for partial separation was again reaffirmed.44 The
Court revisited this problem in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-
vices.45 After his resignation from the Presidency, Nixon had executed
an agreement with the Administrator of General Services which lim-
ited access to certain documents accumulated during his term of office.
After five years of limited access, the agreement stipulated that the
documents could be destroyed at Nixon's behest. Congress passed a bill
signed into law by President Ford which directed the Administrator to
take custody of the documents. On appeal, Nixon argued that the act
was unconstitutional as violation of separation of powers. 46 The Court
rejected this contention stating that "the proper inquiry focuses on the
39. See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371,
384-85 (1976). Justice Powell also points out this distinction in Chadha, - U.S.
103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J. concurring). See infra note 130.
40. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703.
41. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
42. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
43. Id. at 706.
44. The judiciary, early in its history, had held that a subpoena may issue to the
President to both compel his attendance as a witness to trial and to produce any paper
which a party to the suite has a right to avail himself or for purposes of testimony. See
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (Marshall, C.
J., presiding).
45. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
46. Id. at 441.
458 [Vol. 8
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extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned function,' thereby rejecting any pure
doctrine of separation of powers.
Separation of powers may also be constitutionally violated when
one branch assumes a function constitutionally entrusted to a coordi-
nate branch. Early in its history the Court addressed legislative en-
croachment in uncertain terms:
It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general
rules for the government of society; the application of those rules to
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other depart-
ments. How far the power of giving the law may involve every
other power, in cases where the constitution is silent, never has
been, and perhaps never can be, definitely stated.' 8
However, in latter cases the degree of constitutionally permissible
infringement by the legislature upon other branches was further re-
fined. In J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,'49 the Court held
constitutional a delegation of quasi-legislative power to the President,
which allowed the President to increase or decrease import and export
duties.50 The Court distinguished between an unconstitutional delega-
tion of law making ability to the executive and a constitutional confer-
ence of discretion to the executive as to the execution of the law.51 It
further held:
Congress has found it frequently necessary to use officers of the
Executive Branch, within defined limits, to secure the exact effect
intended by its acts of legislation, by vesting discretion in such of-
ficers to make public regulations interpreting a statute and di-
recting the details of its execution, even to the extent of providing
for penalizing a breach of regulations. 2
47. Id. at 443.
48. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
49. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
50. Id. at 411.
51. Id. at 407. See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 315-19 (1936) where the Court upheld a delegation of legislative power to the
President. The Court stated that the contention of invalid delegation was irrelevant in
the area of foreign affairs where the executive has full plenary authority.
52. J.W. Hampton, Jr. and Co., 276 U.S. at 406.
1984] 459
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In Springer v. Government of the Phillippine Islands,53 decided
the same year as Hampton, it was held that the legislature had uncon-
stitutionally assumed an executive function when it appointed corporate
directors of the government held National Coal Company. The Court
stated that the legislature had exercised an appointment power wholly
within the province of the executive branch.14 Thus, "[t]he appoint-
ment of managers. . .of property or a business is essentially an execu-
tive act which the legislature is without capacity to perform. .. .
Legislative usurpation of a judicial function was the issue in
United States v. Brown.56 The respondent was convicted under an act
of Congress which made it a crime for a member of the American
Communist Party to hold a position on the executive board of a labor
organization. The Court first stated that the bill of attainder clause"
was intended to implement the doctrine of separation of powers by
prohibiting a legislative exercise of judicial power. 58 The clause should
be liberally construed in order to prevent legislative punishment 59 and a
denial of an individual's constitutional rights.60
Executive incursions into coordinate branches' constitutionally pre-
scribed functions have met with less equivocation on the part of the
Supreme Court. In Little v. Barreme (the "Flying Fish" Case)" the
President's seizure of ships on the open seas, without legislative author-
ity, was seen to be an unconstitutional fashioning of law by the execu-
tive.6 2 It is difficult to say with precision why intrusions by the execu-
tive were initially dealt with on more firm ground than the legislative
instrusions. Perhaps acts by the executive were sui generis more sus-
pect by the Court due to the spectre of the British monarchy still pre-
sent in the minds of many. Another explanation might also be that the
President, by virtue of his singular position in the infant executive de-
partment, brought close scrutiny of his every act to bear upon his office.
53. 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
54. Id. at 202. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
55. Springer, 277 U.S. at 203.
56. 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (per curiam).
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
58. Brown, 381 U.S. at 442-46.
59. Id. at 447-49. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 491-99
(1978).
60. The individual rights of freedom of speech and belief and the right to due
process under the laws were at issue in Brown.
61. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
62. Id. at 177.
[Vol. 8460
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Clearly, the most representative case of the executive overreaching is
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (the "Steel Seizure"
case).6 3 President Truman had commandeered the nations' steel mills
without statutory authority, to avert a national strike of steelworkers.
The President claimed authority for his actions from the aggregate
powers vested in the executive branch under Article II of the Constitu-
tion and particularly under the President's powers as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces.6 ' Both of these arguments were rejected by
the Supreme Court.65 It was clear that the "military powers of the
Commander in Chief were not to supersede representative government
of internal affairs." 66
It is very rare indeed for the court to call the judiciary into ques-
tion on a violation of separation of powers. This may be due to the
unique position the judiciary enjoys vis-i-vis the doctrine. Although a
third branch of government, set out separately in article III of the Con-
stitution, and thus subject to the same constraints under the doctrine as
the executive and the legislature, the judiciary is the branch which en-
forces the constitutional mandates of the doctrine. It thus is preeminent
among the branches as arbiter of the doctrine. Indeed, the judiciary,
for the purposes of separation of powers, must determine the limits of
63. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For an informative study of the political climate and
inside story of the Steel Seizure Case, see generally A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE: YOUNGSTOWN STEEL AND TUBE CO. v. SAWYER (1958).
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
65. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 587-89; cf United States v.
Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1872) (where the Court upheld a seizure of private
vessels in order to transport military supplies, during the time of war. This was justified
due to the direct emergency at hand, even though there was no statute in force). Id. at
629.
In dicta in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., Justice Jackson proposes that there is
substantial dimunition in the "war powers" of the executive where there is merely a
conflict and not a de jure war:
But no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more
sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign af-
fairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly en-
large his mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own com-
mitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.
343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J. concurring).
66. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme
Court, 51 MicH. L. REV. 141, 167 (1952). But cf. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A
Judicial Brick Without a Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 61-62 (1953) which argues
that the President's power under the suspect executive order is the same kind of power
that de facto exists in exigent national circumstances.
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its own power. The very equilibrium of the doctrine depends on the
courts. 67 One case where the Court called the judiciary into question
was In re Debs. 8 There, the Court upheld a lower court of equity's
issuance of an injunction without express statutory authority. Although
the injunction was upheld and did not encroach upon the legislative
lawmaking function, modern commentary points out that Debs "might
be viewed as a case in which both the Court and the executive usurped
the legislative function of Congress."6
Thus it may be said, as an overview of Supreme Court decisions
treating separation of powers, that there exist no clear lines of demar-
cation concerning that which constitutes a violation of the doctrine.
This is a field of constitutional decisionmaking where very broad, yet
primordial, principles are applied on a case-by-case basis, each subse-
quent case further elucidating the meaning of separation of powers. In
Chadha, the Supreme Court once again faced the task of interpreting
this difficult doctrine.
III. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha
A. The Facts of Chadha
Jagdish Rai Chadha was admitted to the United States on a non-
immigrant student visa in 1966. He is an East Indian, born in Kenya
and the possessor of a British passport. His student visa expired on
June 30, 1972. The District Director of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service ordered Chadha to show cause why he should not be
deported. This occurred on October 11, 1973. Pursuant to statute70 a
deportation hearing was held on January 11,1974 before an immigra-
tion judge. Chadha admitted his deportable status, but the hearing was
adjourned in order to allow him to file an application for suspension of
deportation under statute.71
67. See Fellman, The Separation of Powers and the Judiciary, 12 REv. OF POL.
357, 376 (1976).
68. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
69. Levi, supra note 39, at 382.
70. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1976).
71. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1) pro-
vides in relevant part:
(a) As hereinafter prescribed in this section, the Attorney General may,
in his discretion, suspend deportation and adjust the status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, in the case of an alien
[Vol. 8
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The deportation hearing was continued after Chadha had submit-
ted his application for suspension. On June 25, 1974, on the basis of a
character investigation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and supporting afidavits, the immigration judge ordered Chadha's de-
portation suspended and submitted a report of suspension to Con-
gress.7 2 Congress had the power by statute to veto such a suspension.7
Congress did not exercise this veto power until the first session of the
Ninety-Fourth Congress. On December 12, 1975 a resolution was in-
troduced into the House of Representatives opposing the suspension of
deportation of Chadha and five other aliens.7 4 The resolution was
who applies to the Attorney General for suspension of deportation
and-(1) is deportable under any law of the United States except the pro-
visions specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection; has been physically
present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven
years immediately preceding the date of such application, and proves that
during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral character
and is a person whose deportation would in the opinion of the Attorney
General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence.
72. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1) pro-
vides in relevant part:
Upon application by any alien who is found by the Attorney General to
meet the requirements of subsection (a) of this section the Attorney Gen-
eral may in his discretion suspend deportation of such alien. If the deporta-
tion of any alien is suspended under the provisions of this subsection, a
complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of
law in the case shall be reported to the Congress with the reasons for such
suspension.
73. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (2) pro-
vides in relevant part:
(2) In the case of an alien specified in paragraph (1) of subsection (a)
of this subsection-if during the session of the Congress at which a case is
reported, or prior to the close of the session of the Congress next following
the session at which a case is reported, either the Senate or House of Rep-
resentatives passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor
the suspension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon
deport such alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own
expense under the order of deportation in the manner provided by law.
74. H.R. Rep. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40247 (1975). The
resolution was passed onto the House Committee on the Judiciary for consideration. It
is fairly clear that the Committee's consideration was perfunctory at best, as is attested
to by Representative's Eilberg's simplistic rationale for the revocation of Chadha's sus-
pension of deportation:
It was the feeling of the committee, after reviewing 340 cases, that the
1984]
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passed without debate or a recorded vote. It was neither presented to
the Senate nor to the President, as is constitutionally mandated for
legislation.
In the wake of this resolution, deportation proceedings were re-
opened. The immigration judge held that he had no authority to rule on
the constitutionality of the House's actions. On November 8, 1976,
Chadha was ordered deported. Chadha appealed to the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals which summarily affirmed the lower administrative
court. Chadha then sought judicial review, under statute, of the admin-
istrative appeal court's decision. He filed a petition for review in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service agreed with Chadha's position and
joined with him in arguing for the unconstitutionality of the House's
actions. The court of appeals invited both the Senate and the House of
Representatives to file briefs amicus curiae.
The court of appeals held that the House was in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers in its exercise of the legislative veto. 5
The House and Senate then filed motions to intervene and petitions for
rehearing. The court of appeals granted the motions to intervene but
denied rehearing. Later motions for rehearing en bane were also de-
nied. Certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court as to
the appeal taken by the House of Representatives. 8 Oral arguments
were had on February 22, 1982. The case was reargued October 7,
1982. The Court filed its final decision June 23, 1983. 7
aliens contained in the resolution did not meet these statutory require-
ments, particularly as it relates to hardship; and that it is the opinion of
the committee that their deportation should not be suspended. I should
emphasize that this is a disapproval resolution and unless it is adopted in
this session of Congress permanent residence will be granted to those
aliens named in the resolution.
121 CONG. REc. 40800 (1975) (statement of Rep. Eilberg).
75. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 436. The case was originally argued before and submit-
ted to a panel consisting of circuit judges Ely, Carter and Kennedy on April 10, 1978.
It was then reassigned to a panel consisting of circuit judges Ely, Kennedy and Hug on
August 13, 1980.
76. 454 U.S. 821 (1981). Judgment as to jurisdiction over the Immigration and
Naturalization Service was postponed until the merits.
77. Counsel present in the case were as follows: Alan B. Morrison for Chadha,
the Solicitor General Rex Lee for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Eugene
Greesman for the House of Representatives, and Michael Davidson for the Senate.
Briefs amicus curiae were filed by the American Bar Association and the Counsel on
Administrative Law of the Federal Bar Association.
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B. The Majority Opinion
1. Threshold Issues
Before embarking upon the constitutional inquiry concerning the
legislative veto provision in the Act, the Court addressed several thresh-
old issues challenging the justiciability and the jurisdiction of the case.
First, the Court considered a challenge to its appellate jurisdic-
tion.78 The Court reasoned that the Supreme Court was a proper forum
for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1252, that the proceeding below was a
civil suit pursuant to the statute, and that the appellant in this case was
aggrieved by the proceeding below within the meaning of section
1252.79 Even though the Immigration and Naturalization Service to-
gether with Chadha sought the invalidation of the House's action, the
Service was aggrieved because it was bound by statute to execute an
order of Congress which might be held unconstitutional.8" Thus, appel-
late jurisdiction was found to have been properly taken.
The Court next turned to the issue of severability. The Court
soundly rejected the contention that section 244(c)(2) was not severa-
ble from the remainder of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The
Court noted that if the subsection was not severable, the entire statute
would be unconstitutional. Chadha would, therefore, be deported since
the Attorney General would have no power to suspend deportation.81.
However, the Court took notice that the Act employs a self-executing
severability clause82 which renders any portion of the Act held uncon-
stitutional void and severed from the remainder of the Act. s Further-
more, the legislative history of the Act demonstrated that it was in-
tended by its drafters to facilitate severability." Finally, it was stated
that, as a general rule, a provision is presumed severable if the remain-
der of the statute after severability would be operative as law. 5 Thus
"section 244(c)(2) survives as a workable administrative mechanism
78. The Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1976). See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
79. Chadha, - U.S. at .. , 103 S. Ct. at 2773. See supra note 78.
80. Id.
81. Id. at ., 103 S. Ct. at 2774.
82. Id.
83. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 406, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1976).
84. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2775.
85. Id.
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without the one-House veto." 86 Chadha also had standing to appeal.
The Court rejected the position that Chadha lacked injury in fact and
merely represented the interests of the executive branch. The injury
was possible deportation; an injury which would be redressed if the leg-
islative veto were to be held unconstitutional. 7
Likewise, the Court rejected the argument that it should avoid the
constitutional issue in the case on the grounds that Chadha had alter-
native statutory relief available to redress his injuries. Although
Chadha married a citizen of the United States during the pending ap-
peal and might have been accorded resident status as an immediate
relative,88 such classification was speculative at best.89 Equally specula-
tive was the possibility that Chadha may have been granted asylum by
the Attorney General if he was unable to return to his homeland for
fear of persecution. Thus, Chadha had no substantive alternative re-
lief available to him which might have precluded the Court from con-
sideration of the constitutional aspects of the case.
The Court also refuted a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court
of appeals under the Act.91 It was claimed by the House of Representa-
tives that 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a) could not sustain jurisdiction since
Chadha was not challenging the deportation determination but rather
the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision. Nevertheless, it
was held that since Chadha's status as deportable was de facto depen-
dent upon the constitutionality of the Act, he was challenging the de-
portation determination itself. 92 The relief he sought was directly in-
consistent with the deportation order.93 Therefore, jurisdiction was
properly taken in the court of appeals.
Next the Court focused on the contention that the case did not
constitute a genuine controversy under the "case or controversy" clause
86. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2776.
87. Id.
88. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 201(b), 204, 245, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b),
1154, 1255 (1976).
89. Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2777.
90. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2776. The Court here refers to the Refugee Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
91. The court of appeals took jurisdiction under section 106(a) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § lI05a(a) (1976). See Chadha, 634 F.2d at 411-
12; see also Foti v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 375 U.S. 217 (1963).
92. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
93. Id.
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of the Constitution.94 It was argued that this question was moot since
the House and the Senate intervened in the action.95 However, the
Court continued to point out that even "prior to Congress' intervention,
there was adequate article III adverseness even though the only parties
were the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Chadha."9
Resting on the same rationale employed to dispell the challenge to its
appellate jurisdiction, the Court held that, notwithstanding the fact
that Chadha and the Immigration and Naturalization Service both saw
the legislative veto as unconstitutional, Chadha would still have been
deported by the Service. This provided the requisite adverseness.
2. Political Question Doctrine
The justiciability of the case was also brought into question under
the political question doctrine. The gravamen of the contention was
that the "naturalization"97 and the "necessary and proper"98 clauses
conferred upon Congress unbridled power over the disposition of aliens.
Thus any adjudication in the case would amount to a decision of a
nonjusticiable political question.
The Court rebutted this argument by indicating that "[t]he ple-
nary authority of Congress over aliens. . .is not open to question, but
what is challenged here is whether Congress has chosen a constitution-
ally permissible means of implementing that power."99 Baker v. Carr
states that a political question may arise when there is "a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to coordinate po-
litical department. . ... "00 If it were to be held that means of imple-
menting a plenary authoriity was beyond judicial scrutiny under the
political question doctrine, then it would follow that "virtually every
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute would be a political ques-
tion."10' This conclusion is untenable since it would wrest constitutional
decisionmaking from the judiciary, impeding, if not totally disrupting,
its primary article III function.10 2
94. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
95. Chadha, - U.S. at - 103 S. Ct. at 2778.
96. Id.
97. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cI. 4.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
99. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
100. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
101. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2779.
102. Id.
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3. The Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto 03
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, began with the pre-
103. The topic of the constitutionality of the legislative veto had received much
attention prior to the Supreme Court's decision on the case. For an in-depth analysis of
the court of appeals' decision in Chadha see Comment, Limiting the Legislative Veto:
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1721 (1981).
Most scholarly opinion before the determination of the case argued for the uncon-
stitutionality of the legislative veto. See, e.g., Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Sep-
aration of Powers: The Executive on a Leash? 56 N.C.L. REV. 423 (1978); Martin,
The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68 VA. L.
REV. 253 (1982); Stewart, Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 593 (1976); Kahn, In Perpetual Tension: Executive-Legislative Relations and
the Case of the Legislative Veto, 11 PRES. STUD. Q. 271 (1981); Committee on Federal
Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Legislative
Veto Symposium, 28 AD. L. REV. 575 (1976); accord Keefe, Can a Legislative Veto
Be a Bill of Attainder, 68 A.B.A. J. 103 (1982); Nathanson, Separation of Powers and
Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agen-
cies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064 (1981); Cooper and Hurley, The Legislative Veto: A
Policy Analysis, 10 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 1 (1983); But see Javits and Klein,
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitutional Analysis, 52
N.Y.U.L. REV. 455 (1977); Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Re-
sponse to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L. REV. 323
(1977); Schwartz, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1978); Bruff and Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Ad-
ministrative Regulations: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 13§9
(1977); cf. Fisher, A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes, 93 POL. Scl. Q. 241
(1978) (viewing the legislative veto as a useful prudential device). See generally S.
BERBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
(1975) (demonstrating the general pros and cons of the legislative veto as it concerns
delegation of Congressional powers).
Many "general" periodicals also noted the prospective battle on the horizon. Uni-
formly, they view the legislative veto as constitutionally improper. See Witter, The
Legislative Veto: A Fight on the Horizon, BUREAUCRAT, Summer 1980, at 31; Miller,
The Legislative Veto, PROGRESSIVE, May 1978, at 12; Shapiro, Legislative Veto: Lat-
est Power Fight, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1982, at 88; Green and Zwenig,
The Legislative Veto Is Bad Law, 227 NATION 434 (1978).
It is also interesting to note that prior to Chadha, Presidential disapproval of the
legislative veto process transgressed party lines. President Carter voiced strong disap-
proval of the veto. President's Message to Congress Transmitting His Views on the Use
of the "Legislative Veto," H.R. Doc. No. 357, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). President
Reagan also criticized the veto as unconstitutional concerning various bills before him
for consideration. Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981,
1981 PUB. PAPERS 1207 (1981); Amendments to the Tribally Controlled Community
Colleges Assistance Act of 1978, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 7 (1983); Amend-
ments to the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 19 WEEKLY
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sumption of validity of the challenged legislative veto provision. The
only inquiry which the Court was concerned with was the constitutional
basis of the statute, not its wisdom.10 The Chief Justice, however, off-
set this token bow to judicial restraint with the statement that mere
utilitarian virtues will not shield the statute from constitutional scru-
tiny. Indeed, "[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the primary objec-
tives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government .. ."05 This state-'
ment serves two functions. First, it posits a constitutional truism.
Second, it anticipates and undermines Justice White's characterization
of the legislative veto as a useful mechanism.106
The Chief Justice then turned to a discussion of the "presentment"
clauses 07 of the Constitution. It was the Framers' intent that the pre-
sentment clauses provide the necessary safeguards to protect the sepa-
ration of powers. Both the presentment to the President and the Presi-
dential veto were considered integral to the entire fabric of the
Constitution."0 8 The powers given to Congress were "to be most care-
fully circumscribed."109 This was to protect the public from any oppres-
sive legislation which might be passed under the guise of a "private
bill." This danger is one of contemporary concern, given the various
political sentiments which might prompt self-interest legislation not
calculated to evince the will of the people in general. The Chief Justice
also pointed out that the presentment clauses insure a national view-
COMP. PREs. Doc. 38 (1983).
104. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2770.
105. Id. at 2781.
106. Id. at 2785 (White, J. dissenting). This, as is seen later, is a vast oversimpli-
fication of Justice White's position in his dissent, amounting to the commission of a
"straw man" fallacy.
107. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3 provide in relevant part:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the
United States. . . . Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Con-
currence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President
of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be ap-
proved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules
and Limitations presented in the Case of a Bill.
Id.
108. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2782.
109. Id.
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point in the legislative process. 110 Although the legislature is the elected
body representative of the aggregate of the people, so too is the Presi-
dent elected. There may be some situations in which the people's will is
better represented by him. It is in this capacity as the executive repre-
sentative of the people that his veto has full significance. It manifests a
check for the people on improvident legislative measures, just as the
two thirds veto override of Congress operates as a cross-check for the
people against ill-advised executive denials of the legislative will.
Having dealt with the presentment clauses, Chief Justice Burger
turned to the issue of bicameralism.""' He stated that a primary pur-
pose of bicameralism is to protect against hatily considered legislation.
The requirement of passage by both Houses of the legislature makes
mandatory careful and full consideration of any proposed law before it
cvould take effect.11 2 Nonadherence to the bicameralism principle could
erupt into a legislative tyranny. At first blush, this view seems plausi-
ble. However, upon perusal of the Chief Justice's bicameral argument,
it becomes apparent that his conclusion rests upon an ill reasoned inter-
pretation of the purposes of bicameralism. Certainly the primary pur-
pose of the bicameral requirement was to assuage the lesser populated
states as to their representation in the legislature. By providing for the
Senate, the Framers called for equal representation by state, regardless
of the relative population of the states. This was not the case with the
representation of the House of Representatives, allotted solely on the
basis of population. This protected individual state identity-if not, in a
sense state sovereignty-in the congress. Thus, any legislation to be put
into effect must both pass a vote by the representatives of the numbers
of people and by the representatives, irrespective of the numbers, of the
several states. This is not to say that the Chief Justice's reasoning is
without merit. Close scrutiny of proposed laws is an important incident
to bicameralism. However, it is misleading to place this rationale upon
the Framers as an exclusive one.
The majority then turned to the analysis of the constitutionality of
110. Id. at 2782-83.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 provides that "[a]ll legislative powers herein
agranted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a
Senate and House of Representatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 also insures bi-
cameralism. See supra note 107.
112. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2783. See also Brief for Appellee at
57, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764
(1983); Brief for Appellant at 29, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha,
- U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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section 244(c)(2) under the presentment causes, bicameralism, and the
separation of powers. Chief Justice Burger stated that "[a]lthough not
'hermetically" sealed from one another, . . .the powers delegated to
the three branches are functionally indentifiable."113 When a branch
acts, there is a presumption that it acts constitutionally within its
sphere of delegated powers. 114 However, in order that the acts of the
House may be held to the letter of the presentment clauses and bicam-
eralism, it must be established that the House acted in a legislative
manner. The Chief Justice held that there can be no doubt that the
House of Representatives acts were legislative in nature. The House
sought to alter the legal rights of Chadha, the Attorney General, and
administrative officials in general. This alteration could only have been
achieved by legislation, since there is no plenary authority under the
Constitution for such acts by the House.11 5 The intent of Congress in
authorizing the one-house legislative veto also demonstrates its legisla-
tive veto also demonstrates its legislative nature:
After long experience with the clumsy, time consuming private bill
procedure, Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the
Executive Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the au-
thority to allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in cer-
tain specified circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to
delegate authority is precisely the kind of decision that can be im-
plemented only in accordance with the procedures set out in
Art. I."16
Thus, given the legislative character of its acts, the House has in-
vaded the executive's constitutionally delegated powers by circum-
venting the presentment clauses and bicameralism. There are four situ-
ations in which one house may act without presentment and these
situations are expressly set out in the Constitution: 1) the House of
Representatives may initiate impeachment proceedings, 2) the Sen-
ate may conduct trials of impeachment and convict pursuant to those
113. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2784.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2784-85.
116. Id. at 2786. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-15, Immigration
and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (argued
Feb. 22, 1982) where Mr. Gressman, counsel for the House of Representatives, is ques-
tioned in hypothetical form about such a delegation and its legislative character.
117. Chadha, - U.S. at-, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl.
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proceedings,"1 3) the Senate has final approvement power over presi-
dential appointments,119 and 4) the Senate may ratify presidentially-
negotiated treaties. 20 In the face of these express exceptions to present-
ment and bicameralism, it is apparent that the Framers intended that
these be special instances and that no implied powers along these lines
should be recognized.121 The constitutional tapestry is woven with the
inviolable thread of separation of powers which was "intended to erect
enduring checks on each Branch."' 2
The House of Representatives argued, however, that the affirm-
ance of the court of appeals would have the effect of sanctioning law-
making by the Attorney General, which in turn would amount to a
circumvention of the bicameral process.1 23 The Chief Justice cogently
pointed out that even though agency activity may be viewed as quasi-
legislative, bicameral checks on this activity are not constitutionally
mandated since executive acts within the administrative activity are
limited in scope by statutory enactments of Congress, pursuant to arti-
cle I, sections 1 and 7. Therefore, the Attorney General acts presump-
tively in an executive capacity, although delegated by Congress certain
quasi-legislative responsibilities; a capacity which does not receive con-
stitutional scrutiny under bicameralism or under the presentment
clauses.' 24
Thus, the majority in Chadha held section 244(c)(2) unconstitu-
tional in violation of separation of powers os set forth in the present-
ment clauses and the mandate for bicameralism, affirming the judg-
ment below in the court of appeals. 25
C. Justice Powell's Concurrence
Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment of the majority, would
118. Chadha, - U.S. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CON ST. art. I, § 3, cl.
5.
119. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
120. Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2786. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
121. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2787.
122. Id.
123. Brief for Petitioner, U.S. House of Representatives at 40, Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
124. Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2785 n.16.
125. Id. at 2788.
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hold the legislative veto as applied in this case unconstitutional as a
violation of separation of powers on different grounds from the major-
ity. Justice Powell rightly noted the breadth of the majority's holding;
it "will invalidate every use of the legislative veto."12 In a plea for
judicial restraint, Justice Powell stated that the holding of the Court
"should be no more extensive than necessary to decide this case." 117
Congress evidently viewed the legislative veto as an essential check on
its delegation of power to the executive in the form of administrative
agencies. Due to the nature of the legislature as a coordinate branch of
government, due respect should be accorded its judgments, inasmuch as
the constitution .will countenance such respect. Thus, Justice Powell
would hold that Congress has assumed a judicial posture in violation of
separation of powers in its use of the legislative veto in this case. He
would not reach the overly broad questions of validity under the pre-
sentment clauses and bicameralism.' 28 However, Justice Powell's opin-
ion must not be easily dismissed as a limited holding, merely deferen-
tial to a coordinate branch of government. The opinion is tightly
reasoned, and provides a more secure rationale for Chadha than the
majority furnishes.
Justice Powell begins his analysis by establishing the Framers' at-
tention to the necessity of the separation of the legislative and judicial
branches. Such intent may be seen in the text of the Constitution in the
bill of attainder clause, which must be read as an implementation of
the separation of powers doctrine.129 The doctrine may be violated in
two ways. First, a branch may interfere with another branch's constitu-
tionally delegated function. Second, a branch may actually assume a
function delegated to a coordinate branch unconstitutionally. This case
is of the second genre.130
That the House usurped a judicial function in Chadha is clear.
First, they had not enacted a general rule, rather they had specifically
determined the status of Chadha's individual rights. 31 Second, even if
the House's actions were not to be seen as providing a de novo adjudi-
126. Id. (Powell, J. concurring).
127. Id. at 2789.
128. Id. at 2792.
129. Id. at 2789-90. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Although Justice Powell
does not assert that the legislative veto is a bill of attainder per se, such a position has
been advanced. See Keefe, supra note 103, at 103.
130. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2790 (Powell, J. concurring). See
supra note 39.
131. Id. at _., 103 S. Ct. at 2791.
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cation, they have taken on the color of an appellate tribunal.3 2 This
has dangerous implications for Chadha's rights. Congress, unlike the
courts, is not bound constitutionally by substantive rules of due process,
nor "procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing
before an impartial tribunal .. ."" This danger was further com-
pounded in this case where the House abandoned even its own normal
procedures for considering resolutions due to time constraints.134 In-
deed, "[t]he only effective constraint on congress' power is political. 13 5
This hardly provides a procedural safeguard against an abuse of a per-
son's individual rights. Further, although Congress "is most accounta-
ble politically when it prescribes rules of general applicability,"136 here
it prescribed a special rule determinative of Chadha's individual rights.
Thus, there is no shred of political accountability here. 37
Justice Powell also successfully rebutted the majority's criticism of
his position that Congress had assumed a judicial function. Chief Jus-
tice Burger states that Justice Powell's position cannot be maintained
because the determination of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice presented an nonjusticiable issue, unreviewable by a court on ap-
peal.138 Justice Powell aptly reasoned in retort that "reviewability" is
not coextensive with "adjudication." Although procedurally a court of
appeals may not review a substantive decision by the Attorney General
in such a case, this does not diminish the judicial character of Con-
gress' acts.139
The strength of Justice Powell's opinion can best be seen in the
light of Consumer Energy Comm'n of America v. FERC,1 40 summarily
affirmed by the Court subsequent to Chadha. In FERC, a legislative
veto in a natural gas pricing rule promulgated by the Federal Regula-
tory Commission was held unconstitutional. However, in FERC the
132. Id.
133. Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
134. Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.6. Congress had the Attorney General's
report on the suspension of Chadha's deportation for a year and a half. However, there
was no action taken until three days prior to the running of the statute of limitations
period. Thus, the resolution was neither circulated nor effectively debated.
135. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2792.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2787 n.21 (majority opinion).
139. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2791 n.8 (Powell, J. concurring).
140. - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983). The lower court's opinion may be
found at 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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veto was a two-House veto. This vitiates the force and applicability of
one prong of the majority's holding in Chadha.
Thus, Justice Powell was not willing to declare, as the majority
did, the unconstitutionality of every legislative veto provision. These
provisions are extant in numerous enactments of Congress and may
present differing degrees of intrusiveness, some of which may be uncon-
stitutional, others which may not.14
D. Justice White's Dissent
Justice White strenuously dissented from the majority's holding.
He joined Justice Powell in a plea for judicial restraint, although Jus-
tice White would not hold the legislative veto in this case unconstitu-
tional. Initially, Justice White recognized the utility of the legislative
veto as evidenced by its historical application.142 In his view Congress
faces a dilemma in the absence of the legislative veto. Either the legis-
lature must refrain from delegating authority to the executive or it
must allow the adminstrative agencies unbridled lawmaking power.14 3
He then attacked the majority's heavy reliance on the Framers' intent
in deciding the constitutional question. The complexities of modern
government are well beyond those which confronted the Framers.14 4
However, not willing to rely solely upon this utilitarian argument, Jus-
tice White proceeded to the conclusion that the legislative veto in
Chadha does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
Justice White argued that only bills and equivalent enactments of
Congress should be required to pass muster under the presentment
clauses and the requirement of bicameralism. The legislative veto does
not rise to the dignity of a bill because "[t]he power to exercise a legis-
lative veto is not the power to write new law without bicameral ap-
proval or presidential consideration."" 45 The legislative veto no more
gives Congress lawmaking ability through one house than the presiden-
tial veto gives such power to the executive. 46 The presentment clauses
only apply to actions for which concurrence of the two houses is "nec-
141. See Chadha, - U.S. at _, 103 S. Ct. 2792-2816 passim (White, J.
dissenting).
142. Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2793-96.
143. Id. at -' 103 S. Ct. at 2793.
144. Id. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2798.
145. Id. at .__, 103 S. Ct. at 2799.
146. Id.
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essary."1 47 It is not clear that this mandate covers the legislative veto in
this instance. Legislative authority is delegated to agencies as a matter
of course. Justice White argued that the Congress must have an effec-
tive means to check the power of such agencies which is thus dele-
gated. 14 8 Paradoxically, the majority held that the independent agen-
cies may indulge in making "rules" with the force of law, whereas the
legislature, the branch constitutionally entrusted with lawmaking au-
thority, may not check such power in the agencies.149
Justice White also urged that there is a de facto concurrence of
opinion on the part of both houses and the President. The Attorney
General manifests the President's approval in submitting a report to
Congress recommending suspension of deportation. The House and
Senate may tacitly approve this recommendation by their silence. If
either the Senate, the President, or the House of Representatives dis-
agrees, then Chadha's status is maintained deportable. 150 The suspen-
sion order does not in and of itself maintain Chadha as nondeportable,
it merely defers deportation. 151 Thus, there has been a concurrence of
the three interested entities before a change of Chadha's status.
Justice White's argument is suspect on three points. First, there
has not been a concurrence of the House and Senate in this case. The
House of Representatives acted on its own in its veto. Second, the con-
cept of tacit approval by either the Senate of the House's action or by
both houses of the Attorney General's suspension of deportation is
highly debatable. It is more likely that silence on the part of either
house manifests nescience or apathy rather than considered approval.
Third, the contention that Chadha's status is not altered from that of a
deportable alien to that of a nondeportable alien by the Attorney Gen-
eral's suspension of deportation begs the question. Concurrence of opin-
ion on the part of the two houses and the executive are necessary to
establish the status of Chadha.
Justice White's arguments against the necessity of presentment
and bicameralism for the validity of the legislative veto further draw
light upon the insufficiencies in the majority's opinion, lending transi-
tively more force to Justice Powell's concurrence. Justice White at-
tempts to draw Justice Powell's opinion into question by asserting that
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
148. Chadha, - U.S. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2802 (White, J. dissenting).
149. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2804.
150. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2806.
151. Id. at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2807.
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Congress has not exercised a judicial function, since a refusal of sus-
pension by the Attorney General is judicially reviewable.' 52 However,
this argument is ill-founded. In Chadha, it is the reviewability of grant-
ing of suspension of deportation that is the question. The problem is
that Congress has put itself into that reviewing posture.
Therefore, even though Justice White would not hold that all leg-
islative vetoes are constitutional, he would hold that in Chadha the veto
did not violate the separation of powers. Indeed, the veto provides "a
necessary check on the unavoidably expanding power of the agen-
cies. . .as they engage in exercising authority delegated by
"1153Congress.
E. Justice Rehnquist's Dissent
Justice Rehnquist declined to reach the merits of the case. He
opined that section 244(c)(2) was not severable from the remainder of
the statute. Stating that a severability clause was not dispositive on the
issue of severability in general, he argued that the intention of Con-
gress discloses the section's inherent unseverability. Congress never in-
tended that a class of persons in Chadha's position would be able to
take advantage of a suspension of deportation.15 Thus the statute is
only severable if Congress would have intended that the Attorney Gen-
eral be able to suspend deportations without the section in question. To
hold otherwise would be to expand the statute beyond its own
bounds . 55 However, the majority's tripartite test for severability en-
tirely undercuts this offering. 58 Justice White joined in the dissent.
IV. After the Fall: What May Congress Do?
It is evident from the Court's decisions subsequent to Chadha that
the breadth of the majority's holding will reach all legislative veto pro-
visions in other statutes. 57 The central issue now is: how may Congress
constitutionally implement alternative schemes for checking powers
delegated to the administrative agencies?
152. Id. at . 103 S. Ct. at 2810.
153. Id.
154. Id. at . 103 S. Ct. at 2816 (Rehnquist and White, JJ. dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Id. at ... _, 103 S. Ct. at 2774-76 (majority opinion). See supra p. 22.
157. See FERC, - U.S. , 103 S. Ct, 3556; Consumers Union v. FTC, -
U.S. ... , 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983) affig 691 F.2d 575 (1982) (en banc).
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One issue left open by Chadha is severability. Although the legis-
lative veto provision in Chadha was deemed severable, such may not be
the case in all statutes, depending on explicit statutory language and
legislative history. A constitutional attack on a non-severable legislative
veto provision would result in the unconstitutionality of the otherwise
valid remainder of the statute in question. Thus Congress may step
back and allow the judiciary to invalidate legislative veto provisions on
constitutional grounds, on a case-by-case basis. The main drawback
with this "wait and see" scheme is that the courts will have to deter-
mine in each case the severable or non-severable nature of each veto
provision, hardly an efficient or uniform method of settling the dispute
at hand. It seems clear that the first step in a resolution of Congress'
dilemma must be to excise all legislative veto provisions from statutory
law. Having done this, Congress has numerous options at its disposal to
replace the checks on the administrative agencies previously afforded
by the legislative veto.
Although some doomsayers have proposed that all rulemaking ca-
pacities of agencies should be eliminated or that there be a constitu-
tional amendment to validate the legislative veto, 58 there exist more
prudent measures available to Congress. Congress may choose to dele-
gate with greater specificity to the agencies. 1 With greater restrictions
accompanying delegation to the agencies, Congress would retain a
check on agency overstepping without putting itself in the unconstitu-
tional role of an appellate body. This would result in extremely compli-
cated statutory law making in many ways resembling code enact-
ment.160 It would require a virtual overhaul of well over one hundred
statutory provisions. A more expeditious alternative along these same
lines simply would be to revoke much of the authority already residing
in the agencies. More than likely, a combination of these two ap-
proaches would prove most effective.
Congress may also opt for a more formal scheme to check agency
power. One such scheme might be a "delayed effectiveness" provision
allowing Congress a period of time to enact legislation to annul or oth-
158. See Smith and Struve, Aftershocks of the Fall of the Legislative Veto, 69
A.B.A. J. 1258, 1261, 1262 (1983).
159. Congress has already taken steps in this direction by imposing new restric-
tions on the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See H.R. 2668, 98th Cong., Ist
Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H4759 (daily ed. June 29, 1983).
160. How Congress May Replace the Legislative Veto, Bus. WK., July 11, 1983,
at 29.
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erwise affect a newly enacted regulatory rule161 The problem with this
approach is that such a provision would seem to be subject to bicamer-
alism and presentment criteria, as was the case with the legislative
veto.1 6
2
Congress may also resort to a more coercive measure. It may cur-
tail agency power by declining to authorize funds for activities it deems
undesirable.1 1 3 This approach may be lacking since it would foster
"special interest" lobbying concerning funds allotted to specific agen-
cies. It may be argued that this is already a common practice regarding
agency funding; however, it is clear that this common practice would
be escalated if such withholding of funds became "formalized" as a
Congressional check against the executive agencies.
V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Chadha has vast implications on
the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. It de-
nudes as unconstitutional a longstanding legislative mechanism for
checking agency abuse of delegated rulemaking power, making it nec-
essary for Congress to adopt alternative schemes to accomplish this
goal. The range of statutes so affected is broad; so broad that the Court
invalidated more legislation in Chadha than was invalidated cumula-
tively in the entire history of the court.'
There are reservations concerning the breadth and logic of the ma-
jority's holding. Justice Powell's well reasoned concurring opinion pro-
vides a better rationale for the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto
and demonstrates a properly narrow holding on facts of the case, a
holding which would not unadvisedly call to task all legislative veto
provisions.
Regardless of the wisdom of the majority's holding, Chadha stands
as the most recent pronouncement on the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers, a doctrine which commands a central position in the development
of constitutional interpretation. From its inception in Greek philosophy,
through its crucial formulation by Montesquieu and ultimately to its
uneven treatment in the Supreme court, the doctrine has remained at
161. Smith and Struve, supra note 158, at 1261.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1262.
164. Chadha, - U.S. at , 103 S. Ct. at 2810-11 (White, J. dissenting).
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the vortex of political controversy. Chadha is no exception to this
observation.
Fred L. Rush, Jr.
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